The online certification system, which has data on the identity and behaviour of students and teachers across the school, is in a sense more sensitive than many business systems. If leaked or abused, it is not just a technical problem, but also a matter of responsibility and trust.
The account number and password are top priority assets.
The identification documents must be encrypted, the passwords cannot be stored and the transmission process should go through an encryption channel. We strongly recommend that authentication certificates not be used to store a copy of the weak protection locally on the school WiFi netshell_AUTH_BILLING system, which allows for the matching of a unified identity, reducing one document by risk. Backup data is also encrypted and cannot be made available to ordinary flash drive or cloud disks, which are high frequency minefields.
The Internet Behavior Log is sensitive personal information
Who, when, from which IP, and what address are they visited, such logs are personal or even sensitive personal information in many jurisdictions subject to the relevant legislation. The length of retention is not as long as it is good, nor does it want to be deleted, but they are kept up to date and destroyed by the rules.
Inner network isolation is the most tangible protection.
Authentication & Billing ’s management backstage must not be exposed to the public network. It should be placed in VLAN, which is offline on campus web management, and can be accessed via VPN or boarder. Databases and service portals are also kept as small as possible, so they cannot listen to the Internet by means of internal communications. We've seen schools that view their ports over the public grid for remote convenience, and then scan them to the weak. Isolation seems to be the least costly and most effective way to block most external attacks. This is a mandatory requirement.
The power is to be divided, not centralized.
The system has to split the operating privileges: if a log can be read, it can be configured and guided by different characters, not one person should have full access. Administrators need to use a few and precise accounts, and daily maintenance of normal ones requires high-end operations to be changed. All high-level permission actions are subject to audit records, and whoever changes any strategy can then be restored. Once the central account is stolen, the data on the Internet is opened up for the entire school, and this risk cannot be overemphasized.
The bottom line is in the system, not just technology.
Finally, data security and log retention cannot be based on system default configuration alone; they fall into the school’s internal system: how long it is left, who can access it, how much to report what happened, and how often it is done. Technology provides capacity, systems guarantee implementation. School WiFi web-based Authentication & Billing has been able to run well again, and if there are problems with data compliance, the experience effort ahead may be zero.
Regular security awareness training
The practice of security guards writing the administrator’s password on ease of posting, sending and receiving account forms in personal mailboxes, and logging backstages on public computers is more common than a system leak. Schools regularly train personnel involved in the system on safety awareness, identify what they can do or cannot, and turn good practices into team default action.
Establishment of data security incident disposal plan
If the data leaks or goes over, it will be a matter of speed and size. The school has to write in advance: who will judge the level of the event, report it, inform the affected students and teachers, and leave evidence to cooperate with the investigation. The plan cannot stop on paper, but regularly rehearses key steps to make people aware of their role."What happens after the accident?"It is not until something happens to you that you're busy and missing the best disposal window.
Retroactivity of data for auditability
The key to the retention is not to be stored in it, but to be regulated and able to be redeployed and transformed. The retention cycle is set as compliance requirements, which can be destroyed by due date without either extension or arbitrary pre-drawn; the access logs are subject to independent audit, who checked them and why they were searched; storage media are protected against tampering and subsequent scratches. Making a chain of memory retroactive and irreconcilable is both compliant and good evidence for real event investigations. Data security ends not with single point technology, but with a closed ring that can be tested.