WiFi's actual certification system is not properly installed, but it is the log that keeps it right and auditable. Many units are well run. Once they have been monitored for random logs, they find that they are not long enough to keep them, that the fields are not matched, that the query interface is dead, and that they are judged as non-compliant."Second half article"It's not good. The certification is a little more steady than it is.
To keep the logs, list fields first
At least the logs generated by real name authentication include: user identification, authentication time, downline time, IP and MAC used, site point or target (particle size as required by regulation), authentication method, failure factor. Each category is stored in a regulated template field name and format, not named for itself. The first step we do is to get the regulated data specification, map the fields by line into the system, which one of them is missing. Common pits are only records of certification success, no record of failure, and regulatory questions about results."How many certification failures and why at some point?", no answer. The field list is to be aligned and not stored in the system.
Keep it in the statutory area.
The logs are not stored as long as they last. There is a minimum mandatory retention period, usually 60 days, with specific reference to the site and territories. Under that minimum, supervision does not detect any irregularities; it is much higher than and violates the minimum personal information storage time. WiFi's real name certification system has been designed to configure the retention period, set default values for the statutory minimum period, auto-cleansing dues and clean up movements. We recommend that clients write the retention strategy into the system document, leave the change to go for approval, and do not carry the changes."Keep it for later."The log was kept for a year, and it was noted that the retention of personal information was overstayed and caused trouble.
Storage capacity is calculated ahead of the peak.
A 5,000-day certified site, with hundreds of bytes per record, 60 days a hundred and hundreds more, plus Internet details. With inadequate storage, the system runs full for months, either writes new logs or starts to lose old logs, both fatal. The memory is stored at least twice as much before the line, according to the size of the user and the retention period, and plans for the way it is extended. We have seen a project that has been stored without warning, that records are quietly stopped, that controls detect nearly a month of blanks and that immediately causes problems. Storage capacity and alerts are the physical basis for retaining the drop-in.
The interfaces are connected. We can't just send them out.
The log is reported to the public security designated platform, and it does not just drop the file. The format, encryption, frequency, receipt confirmation are checked with the other platform. We stress that a complete connection must be made before we go online: send a test data confirming that the other party can correctly interpret, store, and search on condition."Sended successfully", but the other party’s platform field failed to parsing it. The connection covers normal data, boundary data, unusual data, and confirms that each person can handle it correctly in all circumstances.
Query must respond fast enough. Practice must be done.
The regulatory transfer is often time-bound, requiring how long to provide authentication and online records for the specified period."Control of the certification"As a regular exercise, quarterly simulations are performed from the request to the complete data, time and accuracy of response. There have been units that have not practiced, come to check, the query statement has run 20 minutes and is difficult to see.
Data consistency and timing are high-intensity areas
Audits are most afraid of misalignment and time-related inconsistencies between identity and online behaviour. For example, authentication records record A time, with a B time limit for Internet access, minutes away, with a gap in the chain; or identification signs that are not identical in both logs. We require that all times within the system be used for uniform clocks (NTP synchronization), and that the identifiers be used on the same main key throughout the process.
Local retention and external reporting are separated from duties
The logs are to be kept locally for self-checking and reported externally for supervision, with separate functions. Local retention is designed for peacekeeping audits on a mobile basis, only the field reporting is required for monitoring purposes, and only addresses are specified. The full local log bank cannot be opened directly to the public or its internal data particle size relaxed for reporting purposes. WiFi authenticated system"Local library"and"Reporting Module"As a separate link, the reporting module reads only necessary fields. We have seen units that give the entire log bank access to third parties for convenience, resulting in data leaks. The segregation of duties is not consistent, and retention and docking are dangerous.
Re-interpretation of audits as ongoing work
Regulatory norms change, the interfaces are upgraded, and log retention and audit docking are not done once online. We suggest that units include this in their daily operations: monitor success rates, regularly rehearsed certificates, attention to regular updates, and retention strategies are adjusted by regulations. WiFi real-name certification system manufacturers usually follow up on upgrades, but they have a proactive role to play in the suppliers themselves. The second half of the article is written that the real-name certification system is truly closed, or else the certification process is still beautiful and the monitoring remains weak.