The public place offers WiFi, and the real name certification is not a problem that the unit wants to do, it's a statutory requirement. But when you really get down there, many people are against it."Real name""The understanding stays in"Let the user enter a password for your cell number."The connection between WiFi’s real name certification system and the operator’s actual name requirements is very detailed, any link is not connected, either the authentication is not going through, or the data are not transmitted, or the inspection is being monitored without a compliance certificate.
The real name of the phone is just the first level, not all.
Users fill in cell phone numbers, take the authentication codes. This step only proves that"This number will take the text."It's not proof."The WiFi guy is the number owner."The regulatory requirement is to match online behavior with real identity, so many scenes require further verification, such as uploading ID cards, face matching or second check of the operator's real name library. We find that in doing the mall project we only go text-mail validation, and there's no approval from the supervisor, requiring a replacement of the identification."It's connected."The design involves the identification of local public security requirements for real names before deciding which level the certification process should be.
SMS access to operator compliance gateway.
The authentication code SMS is not just a random text message platform. Regulation of SMS access requires that it be a channel through the operator’s real name, where the content, frequency and use are recorded. Some units have cheaply connected undisclosed SMS interfaces, often delay or fail to receive the authentication codes, and even more difficult is that the operator has determined that the SMS Channel is directly blocked and the entire authentication chain is broken.
We need to set up a way to connect with the operator's real estate.
Some scenarios require WiFi to compare user identification information and operator real-names, confirming numbers and host. The way the interface is relayed is either through a certified API, which is open to operators, or by a unified platform on the public security side. Here the problem is that there are different interface standards, different players have different fields, methods of identification, and return codes, and complete interface documents and test environments before being connected. We have stepped in the pit: one project will only be connected with one operator's return code to understand logic, switch to another, return structure to a different structure, and certification has failed much more than it was wrong to do. The docking document therefore covers all the operators that will be used, and tests run around the house, not just one.
The format and frequency of data reporting should be in line with the control calibre
The logs, identity matches generated by real name authentication are reported to the designated platform in accordance with regulatory requirements. Reporting is not randomly issued, formatted, fields, encryption methods, and frequency of reporting is specified. We have seen a project where data reporting is using an explicit HTTP, which is regulated and does not meet transmission safety requirements, requires that it be encrypted and re-tweeted. There are also fields whose naming and control templates are not matched, and the other platforms receive them but cannot be deciphered, and they are not reported.
Retention periods and query interfaces are easy to miss hard indicators
The real name information is not stored, but it must be kept for long enough as the regulatory requirements require and provide a query interface to verify. The length of time that you have retained, which fields must be left, and how long your query response should be returned are clear at the system design stage. Some units have only validating times, no corresponding identity and details online, and no complete link can be found when the custody comes in. There are also too short retention cycles, automatic liquidations of maturitys, which clarify the period of time that the control will need to check."Could you check it out?"It is even more crucial because it has a direct bearing on whether the unit will be punished.
You have to distinguish between visitors and insiders.
WiFi, the unit’s own staff, usually has an internal account system and a consolidated identity check-in, not always with the operator. But visitors WiFi must have their real names from outside. The WiFi authenticated system needs to be able to distinguish between these two scenarios, using different authentication and reporting paths.
Interface changes and malfunctions need a back-up mechanism.
The operator interface, the regulatory reporting platform are not controlled by a unit; they can be upgraded, maintained, and temporarily malfunctioned. WiFi authenticated systems need to design their own bottoms: for example, when SMS channels fail, there is an alternative channel, local retesting and tabulation when reported down, and the real name is clearly defined as failure rather than death-cracking users over time. We suggest that external dependency availability be managed as part of the system, monitoring, warning, switching exercises. Otherwise, the unit’s network becomes paralyzed, especially during major events.
The docking process needs to leave a complete chain of compliance evidence.
From SMS access qualifications, operator interface authorizations, monitoring of the reported linkage results to retention strategy configuration screens, the whole docking process will have to keep evidence that can be checked. This is what you see when you check the controls. Many units run well and are asked."What about your real name chain compliance?"The evidence chain is not complete, and the system cannot be checked. It is recommended that the docking phase should allow suppliers to cooperate with a compliance match note, which will include each step of the match, the qualifications, interfaces, and test results, for filing and checking. This is a difficult matter, but it can avoid many risks at critical times.